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Abstract
This research analyzes the sociopolitical trends of the 20th century that have
contributed to the susceptibility of the Middle East to extremist organizations, with a
particular focus on Sunni Islamic groups such as the Islamic State. The goal of this
analysis is to show how the failure of states to provide sociopolitical and economic
stability has led to the politicization of religiosity as an alternative to secular authority.
The major aspects analyzed will be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,
imperialism, nationalism, and the eventual turn towards fundamentalist, extremist
organizations within the Middle East. The failure of governmental systems to secure
sociopolitical and economic stability has resulted in the undermining of state authority,
leaving the region susceptible to insurgencies by extremist organizations in the 21st
century that purport legitimized authority through their associations with Islam.

iii

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction

II.

Body
i.

Origins of the Caliphate

ii.

Kharijism

iii.

Ottoman Empire

iv.

Western Imperialism

v.

Nationalism

vi.

1948 UN Partition Plan

vii.

A Turn Towards Fundamentalism

viii. Iraq-Iran War
ix.

Disconnect of the 1990s

x.

Failures of the 20th Century

xi.

Failed States in the 21st Century

xii.

Afghanistan War

xiii. Iraq War

III.

xiv.

Modernization & Political Islamic Fundamentalism

xv.

Arab Spring

xvi.

Politicization of Religiosity

Conclusion

1

Introduction
The success of Sunni Islam insurgencies on nations in the Middle East, such as
the Islamic State (IS), may be more clearly understood by evaluating the
multidimensional cultural, social, economic, and political factors contributing to the
continued difficulties and instability experienced across the region today. Since the
Iranian Revolution in 1978, religious rebellions have expanded their prominence in the
Middle East, offering an alternative to state authority in the wake of perpetual state
deterioration. Deficiencies of the state and a failure to provide for the social, political,
and economic needs of the people have resulted in a sociopolitical disgruntlement
towards secular authority. The state failures perpetuating today are a symptom of cyclical
inadequacies by ruling administrations to address the inherent difficulties at the core of
the complexity of the region.
While the inherent cultural, political, social, and religious divides have
perpetuated across centuries, the larger focus of this analysis will aim to address the
sociopolitical and cultural trends, largely of the 20th century, that have contributed to the
politicization of religiosity across the region today. Decisions made by imperial powers
early in the 20th century would set the stage for the continued deficiency of states to
address the social, political, and economic conflicts that have lingered into the 21st
century. Secular nationalist regimes repressed political and religious freedoms and
charged underlying resentments. As nationalist regimes increasingly modernized,
inequality and social distance between classes would grow and contribute to the division
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and resentment. The politicization of religiosity that has conceptualized around the region
has offered an alternative to state authority that fills the ideological and political voids
prolonged and agitated under flawed state systems.
Disconnect of Western understanding of religious rebellions often assumes the
question of the attraction to Sunni Islamic extremist organizations. An analysis of the
tumultuous and complex history of the Middle East sheds light on the instability of the
region demonstrating how and why religious insurgent groups have gained sympathizers
and thus, legitimacy. “Poverty, ignorance, unemployment, and authoritarian regimes are
the most prominent problems in the Middle East regarding involvement with radical
groups,” and these unresolved difficulties have only prevailed over the course of the 20th
and into the 21st century.1 From the backlash against Western derived pressure towards
secularization and modernization, to the poisoning of culture and underlying feelings of
exploitation and resentment; the continued failure to establish a sense of community and
a stabilized state that address the sociopolitical, cultural, and economic voids have
contributed to the rise in politicized religious groups that provide an alternative authority
with the promise to address perpetual region-wide wrongs.
Modernization of the region caused increasing inequality and social distance
among classes and contributed to the social and economic difficulties across the region.
The sociopolitical reactions would vary throughout the century—from nationalism in
response to European imperialism to secular and militarized nationalism. The repeated
failure of these states to address the inherent challenges presented in the region would
perpetuate instability. It would not be until the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that an
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alternative challenger to the standing authority would present itself, in the form of
religious insurgencies. Religious rebellions would seep into the 21st century, challenging
the increasingly secular nationalist regimes. The success of the politicization of
religiosity, with a focus on Sunni Islamic organizations, may be attributed to these
organizations’ perceived ability to fill the ideological and political void secular
nationalist regimes failed to address. As Kamrava Mehran noted in his introduction to A
Modern Middle East:
although there are vast differences between and within the
histories, cultures, traditions, and politics of each of these
regions within the Middle East, equally important and
compelling shared characteristics unify the region.2
This analysis will humbly emulate Mehran’s concept of considering the region as
a whole, despite the great deal of differences, in hopes of gaining a more comprehensive
understanding of historic influences leading to continued instability and vulnerability
across the region today. Additionally, while dating back to the introduction of Islam, gaps
in the history are intentional, though not for lack of significance. A large part of the focus
will be on modern 20th century influences and those mentioned before are done so out of
necessity to understand the complexity surrounding the sociopolitical atmosphere.
Origins of the Caliphate
Understanding sympathies towards the idea of a unified Muslim community, it is
necessary to return to the origins of the notion of the caliphate and analyze the historic
consequences that have contributed to the influence IS and other extremist organization
sympathizers have today. For definitional purposes, the caliphate referred to throughout
this paper uses the Encyclopedia Britannica’s definition of “a political-religious state
2
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comprising the Muslim community and the lands and peoples under its dominion in the
centuries following the death (632AD) of the Prophet Muhammad.”3 Under the rule of a
caliph (successor) holding “temporal and sometimes a degree of spiritual authority,” the
Caliphate would grow into an empire comprising much of Southwest Asia, North Africa,
and Spain.2
Turmoil within the Muslim community erupted not long after the death of the
Prophet Muhammad in a division that would come to split the Muslim community
henceforth—the divide rested on the premise of who was to be the successor of
Muhammad and how the role of caliph was to be henceforth passed on. The majority
view held was that the community of Muslim followers should select the next caliph,
while the minority view believed that the role should be filled by a family member of the
Prophet Muhammad. This split in theology is the original premise of Sunni—Shiite
division of the Muslim community that would continue to widen and contract over the
centuries for ideological reasons. The division would contribute to the violent beginning
of the Caliphate, though peaceful times existed between the two groups over their
centuries of existence. As a region steeped with a rich history, both ethnic and religious
factionalism exists to this day.
Kharijism
An analysis of historic influences on the modern sociopolitical status of the
Middle East would not be justified without shedding light on an early Islamic sect, of
which contemporary fundamental organizations have been deemed a modern day
extension—the 7th Century emergence of Kharijism. The Khawarij sect originated during
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the first civil war and battle of Siffin in 656 AD, in modern-day Raqqa Syria, after the
murder of Caliph Uthman. The major schism within the community falls on the battle for
leadership. The lasting influence of the Khawarij lies with the rise of terrorism, but also
provides a critical reflection on the importance that the “blend of religion and rule in
early Islam created a logical association in Muslim intellectual tradition.”4 Khawarij
called for puritanical interpretations of the Qur’an where “judgment belongs to God
alone,” and unforgiving punishments to noncompliant apostates.5 The Khawarij, or
“those who rebelled,” were the first Islamic sect to rebel against authority, with acts of
rebellion wreaking havoc on the Umayyah and Abbasid periods supported by other
disenfranchised groups. They legitimized their actions by drawing on the divine and
dismissing secular authority. Their influence held from 750-1250 CE. There is some
debate of whether the Khawarij were a political group or a religious group and thus a
question of their motives, but for the purposes of this analysis their influence they shall
be considered, “a political group that had a religious response to a perceived injustice,” as
deemed by Rudolf Ernst Brunnow.6 The Khawarij early politicization of religiosity and
dismissal of the authority of the state speak to the methods by which fundamental
religious rebellion organizations operate today.
While the direct authority of the Khawarij on the Islamic world would wane after
the Abbasid period, their historic influence would become increasingly important as
Islamic fundamentalist groups gained prominence come the late 20th and 21st centuries.
The following passage by Jeffrey Kenney summarizes how elements of tradition based in
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deeply rooted historic happenings make the Kharijites’ influence on modern terrorist
organizations impressively relevant.
Moreover, those who participate in a tradition never experience the past as
an undifferentiated whole. Their sense of the presentness of the past is
always of a particular past, one with distinctive cast of characters,
authority, and rebellion. It is through these particulars that a tradition
creates continuity between past, present, and future, thereby maintaining
identity through periods of change.7
The reemergence of Khawarij influence that would arise largely during the Iranian
Revolution and into the 21st century would act as a facilitator for the “understanding of
the political, social, and economic roots of Islamic extremism.”8 While significant
differences exist between the extremist organization’s core beliefs and actions, the
elements of tradition employed and exploited by IS and other parallel extremist
organizations find their foundation in Kharijism, by “fill(ing) a deep historical
perspective that had inherent explanatory power.”9
Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire’s success spanning over 600 years demonstrates a manner
of governing the Middle Eastern region by means of a decentralized, provincially based
government with governors overseeing each province under the overarching
administration of the Empire and the ruling sultan, providing a manner of rule fitting to
the tribal, sectarian, territorial factionalism of the region. Those drawn to the idea of a
caliphate today are attracted by the idea of a united Muslim community and reflect on
early rulings like that of the Ottomans as a demonstration of Muslim greatness that once
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was and could once again be.10 Aptly put by historian Professor Hugh Kennedy, “it’s this
Muslim unity, the extent of Muslim sovereignty, that people above all look back to.”11
Corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes of the 20th and 21st centuries, largely
sponsored and promoted by Western countries, have to an extent belittled the complex
construct of the region; but by generally foreclosing options for legal political dissent,
they have also in effect forced the dissatisfied and disenfranchised to seek change in
authority through alternative methods, such as that offered by Islamic fundamentalist
organizations.
The extended success of the Ottoman Empire was founded under Osman Gazi in
1299 CE. In its early stages, the Ottoman Empire grew by way of conquest—welcoming
all overtaken men to join Ottoman forces. Success can also be noted by the Ottomans'
relative tolerance towards other religious sects—undermining European rule by the
Byzantine Empire, which benefited the Ottoman cause as they extended their influence
and rule.12 Gradual expansionism allowed for a base administration and advanced society
to cultivate, which drew Muslims to this new sophisticated state.13 Continued
expansionist campaigns into Europe and Asia were successful and as the Empire’s
society began to progress, a feudal system developed, awarding land to valiant and high
ranking soldiers. An effective government, education system, feudal cavalry, and manner
of tolerance led to widespread success despite persistent conflict.
The stagnation and eventual decline of the Ottoman Empire began with the death
of the Sultan Selim II in 1574. For the next century and a half, the Empire would incur
10
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losses due to internal failures such as incompetent sultans, poor spending and ruling
habits, struggles defending the Empire’s vast borders from foreign invasion and
occupation, failure to modernize military equipment, provincial revolt resulting in civil
wars and power struggles between governors and sultans, and subsequent military
insubordination and rebellion among ranks.14 External factors also contributed to the
Empire’s decline, such as inflation and the globalization of the trade market, immense
military losses including that of Egypt to Napoleon, loss of land and resources through
European and Western advancements and treaties, and the destruction of the Empire’s
naval forces during the Battle of Navarino.15
Restoration of the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century under the leadership
of Mahmud II proved unable to counter the internal political dissolution and opposition
movements. The eventual expiration of the Ottoman Empire would transpire as the
Empire began to turn towards modernizing in the early 20th century; rather than
successfully modernizing and surviving, however, it would instead fall into a series of
strife and war, coming to a final dissolution not long after the close of World War One.
Western Imperialism
Western imperialism set its roots early during the 19th century but would become
an increasingly important factor as conflicts within the Ottoman Empire erupted. The
collapse produced a void of land, resources, and political influence that would create, “a
vacuum that contributed to tensions between local inhabitants and external powers or
interests,” with those external influencers being largely European powers as well as
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Russia.16 It was France and Great Britain with the Sykes-Picot Agreement that would
come to divide up the Middle East, with Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine under Great
Britain’s colonial domination and Syria and Lebanon under French influence; Armenian
provinces and some Kurdish territory fell under Russian influence.
There were significant issues with the division of the Middle East, not the least
among those being that this agreement was short-sighted, imperialist, and understood as a
Western power grab. Lines in the sand were drawn arbitrarily based on British-French
disputes with utter disregard to the 2,000-year history of complex tribal, sectarian, and
nomadic co-existence.17 For centuries prior, the Ottomans had governed the tumultuous
makeup of varying tribes, sects, peoples and territory through a series of provinces.
Turmoil was not a foreign matter during the Ottoman Empire, but it was agreed that a
more centralized system of governance would fail in this ethnic and religiously divided
region. During a British-French dealing, Georges-Picot noted on this matter, “to promise
the Arabs a large state is to throw dust in their eyes. Such a state will never materialize.
You cannot transform a myriad of tribes into a viable whole.”18
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The main problems with the Sykes-Picot Agreement that would create resounding
difficulties were the secrecy with which the deal was made—neglecting promises of
independence made to Arabs, and appointing leaders who were arbitrarily selected based
on the imperial powers' choosing. These problems were compounded by the imposition
of border lines that “did not correspond to the actual sectarian, tribal, or ethnic
distinctions” but were based on compromises by France and Great Britain over their
power struggle for territorial control.20 Lastly, the European imperial enterprise led to the
creation of a state system that had been purposefully avoided under the centuries of
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Ottoman control, under the idea that such a system would only exacerbate issues that had
been present for centuries.21 As was so aptly used to describe the British support of Feisal
as King of Syria and later Iraq - but equally encompasses the harm the Sykes-Picot
Agreement and British and French influence would come to bear on the region — it was
as if they were “building up, like Frankenstein, a monster which would eventually devour
us.”22
Nationalism
Nationalism is an “idea which developed in the nineteenth century, whereby
population groups are bound together through their territorial, cultural, and/or ethnic
links. It emerged partly as a result of the economic, social, and political uncertainties of
the modern, industrializing world.”23 In the Middle East, nationalism would gain support
after imperialist agendas failed to provide economic, social, and political stability
resulting from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the arbitrariness of the following
state divisions. Merging identities under one united nationalist front legitimized the
authority of the movements against the imperialist regimes.
In some aspects nationalism displays quasi-religious characteristics, offering
identity and a sense of belonging to something greater than oneself. By prioritizing a
united identity over any single faction of beliefs, nationalism in the Middle East was able
to transcend many of the inherent difficulties between clashing sects, elevating a sense of
community beyond factional bounds.24 As with differentiations expressed between
religious sects, nationalism too, instilled elements of the denigration of “the other” in
21
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order to bolster the legitimacy and backing of their own identity.25 Look to the pan-Arab
nationalist identity and you can see this idea of an "us- versus-them" identity exemplified.
As Hassan Mneimneh articulates, there emerged “a polarization between majorist and
minoritist propositions in many Arab societies.” Nationalist movements acquire validity
by crafting an identity that fits a large subcategory, focused not on belief but on
territorial, cultural, or ethnic links that are able to transcend the most inherent divides.
Imperialist rule would set the political agenda across the region for a significant
part of the 20th century, influencing national and international politics as well asserting
modernization efforts on the state’s and their economies. Imperialism, the assertion of
foreign agendas, the trend towards modernity, and installment of leaders who were
puppets of the imperialist power would result in the slow spread of nationalism as a
reaction to imperialism. As nationalism took root, it would assume different shapes
across the region. Modernization under the Muhammad Ali Pasha dynasty in Egypt (1805
to 1953) occurred most prominently under Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim (1805 to
1848), creating a unified nationalist identity among Egyptians. This identity was
bolstered by an increased sense of disgruntlement towards foreigners who were holding
more governmental and infrastructure power and influence than the Egyptians
themselves.26 Success of the Egyptian’s nationalist movement would be achieved after a
three year revolution between Egypt and Britain ending in 1922 upon Britain’s
declaration of Egyptian independence.
Similar feelings of dissatisfaction and the resulting rise of nationalism were
experienced in Syria resulting from French occupation. The Druze Revolt/Franco-Syrian
25
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War erupted with initial success by the nationalists, but was eventually suppressed by
French forces. Oppressive imperialist rule that ignored the will of the people was fueling
a far-reaching nationalist response that would come to consume sociopolitical agendas
across the Middle East throughout the century. As would become increasingly apparent
as the century commenced, failed oppressive and non-democratic states were
continuously met with the rise of radicalized and disenfranchised people in the form of
political rebellion. Transitions of power were not often easily nor peacefully achieved,
bolstering the argument that acts of rebellion against the existing state were a successful
form of political action. It was not only the acts of rebellion, but also the motive of the
people to call state authority into question that would foster an immediate and long term
political will that acted in direct contrast with the state, undermining legitimacy.
An analysis of Great Britain’s preventative measures to suppress a stirring
nationalist movement in Iraq demonstrates the imperialist manner asserted by Great
Britain (and notably that which other European forces had on Middle Eastern countries
across the region) when it came to handling uprisings. Winston Churchill, Great Britain’s
Secretary of State of the colonies at the time, was presented with the task of,
“establishing a form of government that would satisfy both Arab aspirations and Britain’s
oil-related strategic interests.”27 Churchill made it quite apparent in his statement to
officials, “do please realize that everything that happens in the Middle East is secondary
to the reduction of expense.”28 Feisal I, recently expelled King of Syria under French
authority, was instated as King of Iraq soon thereafter under Great Britain authority as he
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was the, “best and cheapest solution.”29 A similar approach was taken in the case of the
Transjordan, where Churchill demanded a leader who was “not too powerful, and who
was not an inhabitant of Transjordania, but who relied upon His Majesty’s Government
for the retention of his office.”30 At this pivotal moment in Middle Eastern restructuring,
time and again imperialist powers took self-perpetuating, arbitrary steps rather than
strategic moves to foster long-term success in the region. Their logic also failed to
include sufficient reckoning of the religious dimension of the regional politics.
Come World War II, nationalist politics organized around a call for social
changes under state control ran very separate but parallel campaigns across the region,
demanding change between the state and society. For Syria and Lebanon during WWII,
the rise of social and political unrest derived from fear of repeated famines and depleted
resources mirroring troubles during WWI, the competition for power between rulers and
French colonial authority, and collaborated groups demanding social rights from the
government.10 The culmination of the previously mentioned and weakened French
influence subsequent to wartime conditions are how Syria and Lebanon achieved wartime
independence from France in 1946 and 1944 respectively.31
Decisions made post WWI and echoed suffering in WWII were serious influences
of the mid-century construction of Middle Eastern institutes and drivers of social
change.32 After WWI and WWII, nations under imperialist rule, where the effects of the
wars were felt but were fought by outside powers with little control of own resources,
were frustrated with repeated “subordination of local policies and economies to the
29
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dictates of forces largely beyond local Middle Eastern control.”33 While some narratives
of social reform found footing, it would largely be the nationalist groups that would
prosper. These nationalist movements would ultimately sacrifice civil and political
freedoms, and in doing so fail to address contradictions within the social fabric of the
region’s Western hodgepodge creation of nations.34
Nationalism, while on the rise, would not truly take center stage in the Middle
East until after the 1948 UN Partition Plan, when it would become a region-wide
reactionary measure. However, there were some early hints of its rise in Turkey under
Ataturk and in Iran, as well as within the rise of Zionism—an arguably different strand of
nationalism that would bear great influence on the region. The nationalism that would
rise in prominence as a sociopolitical force across the region was widely secular and
operated by promoting “freedom from the parochial identities of the past—and thereby
avoiding the obstacles that religious loyalties create for a country’s political goals.”35 The
region was comprised of a fairly new set of arbitrarily constructed states which crossed
ethnic, religious, and political factions, unwittingly creating the conditions ripe for the
emergence of regional instability. Elements of modernization, a Western created and
employed construct advocated for through influence of Middle Eastern leaders,
contributed significantly to the secular nature asserted by nationalist parties.
Religion, more than just a means by which to guide one’s individual morals and
life, provided order, and therefore could be interpreted as a challenger to the secular
means of rule that was nationalism, building upon the necessity of suppression by
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nationalist leaders and the need to assert a powerful and enforced means of authority. The
suppression of religious organizations would have a boomerang effect later in the century
as nationalism failed to provide the desired political and economic stability. Nationalism
appeared to be a reflection of the increasing modernization of the era; as Egyptian leader
Nasser would convey more openly later on, nationalism was perceived as an
advancement from the archaic and backwards thinking of religion, forming social and
political cohesion out of Western conceptions, rather than ones founded in purportedly
divine sources.
Turkish nationalism arose post WWI under Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk - the
"father of the Turks") as Turkey broke ties with the Ottoman Empire and defeated efforts
by the Allies to colonize Turkey. Atatürk’s methodology would be emulated across the
region with the rising prominence of nationalism. He sought to create a new sort of
national identity—after centuries of Ottoman rule and arbitrarily drawn borders, his
approach was necessary.36 He attempted to address social ills, economic reforms, and to
develop a secularized, Westernized nation; he did so by suppressing political activists and
religion with a militarist and dissent-free ruling political party approach.33 Turkey’s new
system did bring reform and modernization and would influence other nations in the
region to do the same, but the early Turkish Republic’s foundation was frail, with Ataturk
bending defined practices at his own will to meet his needs.
Beginning in 1921, under similar pretenses, Iran would seek to modernize with
Reza Khan leading the way. Reza sought to modernize Iran, improve its economy, and
irradiate cultural influencers of the past. Reza’s struggle came with the territory—Iran
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was “ethnically and tribally more divided than Turkey, economically and industrially less
developed, and had a more powerful, conservative establishment with which the
modernizing state had to contend.”37 Reza sought to achieve his goals by neutralizing the
tribes with intense military action, personally determine who served in what position,
control all political aspects of the new system, and subdue civic opposition.38
Both Turkey and Iran sought to attain radically different political orders than had
previously been in place and did so in a manner where, “individuals came to personify
systems; politics (were) relegated to the domain of personal relations; and institutions
assumed only secondary importance, to be bent and shaped in whatever way the nation’s
father (Atatürk & Reza) willed.”39 While not without their notable successes, these
systems were “brittle and bound to fall with the slightest tilt in the balance of power,”
according to political historian of the Middle East Mehran Kamrava.36 The struggles
faced and addressed with suppressive measures by Turkey and Iran in an attempt to
cultivate a national identity would come to the sociopolitical forefront of the region as
nations achieved independence from imperialist rule.
1948 UN Partition Plan
Political turmoil and the spread of nationalism across the region were highly
influenced by Zionist nationalism and the resulting 1948 UN Palestinian Partition Plan.
The plan sought to address the Arab-Jewish conflicts in the region that had come
increasingly to the forefront through Zionist efforts to return to their deemed homeland
over the early-midcentury. Jewish migration came in waves and numbers and sentiments
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only increased during WWII with Hitler’s persecution of the Jewish people. Continued
and uncontrollable attacks upon alternate factions and the British colonial presence
forced Great Britain to turn the decision over to the UN. The resulting plan would outrage
Palestinians as it awarded the Zionists an immense swath of land disproportionate to their
population and prior ownership, and left the Palestinians displaced with largely unfertile
land. Additionally, much of the newly appointed Zionist (henceforth Israeli) allotted
territory was inhabited by Palestinians, resulting in the exodus of some 520,000—
1,000,000 Palestinians.40 The humiliation and outrage would soon spread across the
region and Arab countries began acting on their rage by invading the newly appointed
Israeli territory hours after its conception. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war would only result in
further loss of Arab land, holding onto the Gaza Strip and the West Bank only.
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The first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 set the region’s narrative at largely the same
time the majority of the region shed its imperialist influences. This military defeat and
failure to restore Palestinians back to their homeland marred the Arab world, and
nationalism was seen as the answer to their embarrassment and outcries.42 Post-UN
Partition Plan nationalism would only intensify and increasingly shape the politics of the
region for years to come. Nationalism throughout the region became increasingly
41
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militaristic, began to shift towards a Pan-Arab nationalism ideology, and would
increasingly become associated with modernity and the irradiation of traditional
sociopolitical influencers which were viewed as contributors to their failure.41
Nationalism as a sociopolitical response answered calls for unity, economic stability and
a reliable state structure.
In the following excerpt, Hourani outlines the product of independence in the
region: instability due to the lack of a political tradition, encouraging the army or other
militarist offshoots to grasp power, and defining social and governmental norms with
heavy handed repression — all the while largely ignoring the inherent complexities.
Hourani’s passage speaks to the nationalist/authoritarian responses across the region.
Independence has often led to instability, and that for various reasons:
because of the absence of a political tradition, which encourages the
army to take power as the only force standing above sectional
interests; because, once independence is achieved, the relations of
social forces with each other and with the relations of government
have to be redefined; because of the absence of the restraining and
stabilizing power of an imperial government; and, in some Arab
countries, because of a discrepancy between the frontiers of the state
and those of the dominant national idea.43
Nationalism within the region, such as that in Egypt under Nasser, reflected the regionwide militarist and authoritarian nationalist regimes rising to power, and heavy handedly
asserting a national identity representative of their leader. This increasingly militarist
nature of nationalism fits with sociologist Max Weber’s notion that nationalism involved
“loyalty to an authority who holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical
force.”44 The rigidity provided a sense of order—an inherently human desire that was,
under the Ottoman Empire, provided for in daily life as well as within the bounds of
43
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authority by the divine–but largely lacked under questionably legitimate imperialist
regimes and the early days of independence.
Nasser’s rise to power followed the Free Officers military coup of the politically
and militarily incompetent King Farouk in 1952, as a response to his failures during the
1948 Arab-Israeli War. Nasser would not assume the role of President of Egypt for a
few years to come, but his nationalist influences on the formation of the newly declared
Republic ruled state of Egypt were unequivocal. It was his leadership within the Free
Officers that had led to the coup and end of British imperialism, and it would be his
vision that largely shaped the nationalist resulting state. Post-coup, a transition period
was staged where political parties were outlawed and the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) was declared the ruling party, which would strictly and militarily enforce
the suppression of social and political divisions, with the goal of formulating a national
identity. Much like that of Turkey’s ruler Atatürk, Nasser would become a beloved
figure whose presence, rhetoric, charisma, and views would assume the forefront of the
political and ideological face of the new Egypt.45 Nasser was nationalism personified,
bringing Egypt out of the decrepit past with aspects of modernization and secular rule at
the forefront of his message.
Nasser’s treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood, a politically active group founded
on the concept that Islam should govern both the individual and the state, exemplifies
the secular—non-secular struggle and stifling suppression of divisions of thought under
nationalist leaders mid-twentieth century. The Muslim Brotherhood, initiated in 1928,
asserted an initial mission to re-educate Muslims who had lost touch with their faith
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because of Western influences on the region. The organization gained momentum and
followers rapidly and were the most potent group protesting the British-backed
monarchy pre-1952 coup.46 The Muslim Brotherhood backed the coup, believing the
Free Officers mission for a new government would include a foundation in Islam. The
failure for that goal to come to fruition under the new secular government caused unrest
amongst the Brotherhood, and an attempt on Nasser’s life was made by an extremist
member. Without haste, Nasser imprisoned large numbers of the Brotherhood and exiled
them from the political sphere. While they remained suppressed under Nasser, they
increasingly gained support as the standing government continued to economically,
socially, and militarily disappoint. Despite Nasser’s attempts to quell social and political
involvement by the Muslim Brotherhood and resistance groups like them, the
Brotherhood maintains influence on Egyptian society into the present day.
Nasser’s Egypt would be representative of the nationalist movements occurring
across the region during this time, not only creating a sense of nationalism, but fostering
a “Pan-Arab” identity, largely in response to the humiliating loss of Palestine and the
subsequent war and additional losses to the newly formed Israel. Nasser’s voice
reverberated across the region as the answer—spouting impressive military force, a
united identity of the Arab people, as well as the perception of modernism—all
identifiable strands of nationalism. The United Arab Republic formed between Syria and
Egypt and similar alliances formed across the region as Pan-Arab nationalism spread.
Nasser’s eventual downfall would come with the devastating blow during the Six
Day War of 1967. Continued outrage and stressed relations from the 1948 War escalated
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to the point where Egypt, Syria, and Jordan attacked Israel, only to suffer immense
losses of their military forces and of land to Israel. From this blow, no longer would the
unifying notion be to liberate the Palestinians. Arabs were more humiliated and
militarily defeated than before, and their unifying goal would shift to be that of
reclaiming the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the West Bank -- all lost during the
Six Day War of 1967. While Nasserism would come to an end, Nasser’s lasting legacy
of nationalism would continue.
Political instability, faltering economies, military humiliation, and failure rocked
Egypt and much of the region post-1967. The 1973 Yom Kippur War was a subsequent
response to the 1967 War, and one that would result in a ceasefire with unclear winners.
Despite the lack of clarity in an outcome, Egypt’s new leader Sadat (ruled 1970-1981)
declared it a military victory, returning the Sinai and a level of pride to the Egyptians.
No longer was Israel perceived as invincible by Arab forces. The Yom Kippur War
would pave the way for the Camp David Accords agreement signed in 1979 between
Egypt and Israel, an internationally perceived victory and one that addressed much of
the conflict between Egypt and Israel as well as providing a framework for Palestinian
self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. However, the Accords failed to address
many of the lasting ills between Israel and its other Arab neighbors. The Camp David
Accords also isolated Egypt from its Arab coalition, as the perceived Arab nationalist
leader secured a solution for his own country only.
A Turn Towards Fundamentalism
Dr. Henry Munson outlines fundamentalism as a “type of militantly conservative
religious movement characterized by the advocacy of strict conformity to sacred
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texts.”47 Fundamentalists assert that religion encompasses all aspects of life; they
advance literal interpretations of holy texts and assert religious principles maintain
authority or set a moral foundation for both society and the governing body.48 Munson
asserts that the variances between fundamentalist groups are broad; some resort to
terrorism while others do not, but that most “insist on a conformity to a code of conduct
based on a literal interpretation of sacred scripture.”49 As will be articulated in the
following sections, the transition of fundamentalism towards militancy came as a
“rejection of secular modernity” and those initial roots came to the forefront during the
Iranian Revolution.50
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 was a popular revolution against the
standing monarchy led by Ayatollah Khomeini and expressed in a manner differing from
the trending nationalist responses prevalent across the region midcentury. Unlike other
nationalist movements across the region that were largely secular, the Iranian Revolution
would prove an entire overhaul of the established political order with a theocratic system
and Islam providing the uniting force.51 Years prior to the revolt, Khomeini denounced
Mohammad Reza, the Western- backed Shah, for his forward, Western policies.
Khomeini was arrested multiple times and finally exiled by the Shah. Khomeini
continued his fight against the Shah, now with more popularity from his place of exile,
and smuggled his works into Iran. The Shah’s treatment of the Ayatollah only served to
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increase the popularity of his calls away from the Shah’s purported destruction of Islam
in Iran.
Andreas Armborst outlines the differences between Islamic nationalists and
Islamic fundamentalists, with the premise that nationalist institution methodology is
similar to that identified as Islamic nationalism, “unlike Islamic nationalists who try to
assert Islamic ethics and morals top down through state institutions, the Islamic
fundamentalists approach the same goal from the bottom up, that is, through religious
propagation.”52 The catalysts for change were largely those of disgruntlement towards the
Shah’s Western-backed policies as well as resistance to the harsh, oppressive, and corrupt
regime -- where social injustices abounded and in fact prevailed. The monarchy of Iran
was effective at shutting down political resistances and local movements were
suppressed. As Christian Smith argues, Islam was unavoidably the answer—Islamic
groups across Iran had thousands of followers, no underground resistance was necessary
as Islam provided the desired authority, leaders were perceived as untouchable, members
ranged from all realms of society, religious centers served as a base, and relationships
between the clergy and society were strong.53
The fall of the regime would come February 2, 1979, and the establishment of the
theocratic Islamic State of Iran would follow. The Iranian Revolution, mobilized by
Islam, capitalized on social and political grievances that were widely held across the
socioeconomic spheres of Iran. The turn towards traditional and fundamentalist values
served to counter Western influence on the government and its exploitation of the people,
as well as addressed their grievances with the oppressive monarchy.
52
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A similar turn of political movement towards Islamic fundamentalism occurred in
Afghanistan in response to the leftist overthrow of the government in 1978 and the
establishment of a communist regime. The new government profoundly lacked popular
support and thus sought out assistance from the Soviet Union. Pockets of rebellions
began to form, particularly as the Soviet efforts increasingly came by way of military
action.
The core of the rebellion found its basis in the secularization and advanced
modernization practices put forward by the new communist government. The Muslim
fighters known as “mujahideen,” supported by the United States, were able to resist
Soviet forces which led to the eventual signing of the Geneva Accords of April 14, 1988,
stipulating the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As one of the mujahideen factions, the
Taliban rose in popularity with the promise of stability and the strict enforcement of the
rule of law. Similar to the response in Iran, the Taliban was a reversion to Islamic
fundamentalism that experienced widespread support. After extended turmoil, the 1992
overthrow of President Najibullah and the communist regime by the mujahideen led to an
Afghani civil war that concluded with the establishment of the Taliban as the ruling
regime by September 1996.
Iraq-Iran War
Tension between Iran and Iraq mounted as fear of a popular revolution in Iraq
gained footing as Iran’s revolution ensued. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq
invaded Iran in hopes of a quick domination over what he perceived as Iran’s fragile
political order. What was supposed to be a rapid and total domination, transpired from
1980—1988 and ended in a cease-fire with little clarity of a dominant force. The
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economic ramifications of the long and drawn out war were significant and would prompt
Iraq to invade Kuwait—annexing Kuwait and claiming them a providence of Iraq, to be
exploited for their oil surpluses. A rapid and effective U.S. led counter-insurgency was
employed, expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The political, social, and economic
ramifications would resonate within these countries and the region for years to come.
It was around this time when Shi’ite and Kurdish minority groups in Iraq, stronghandedly oppressed under Saddam, separately rebelled against the state. Much like other
ethnic and religious minority rebellions against a state in the region, these rebellions
came in response to a harsh autocratic and oppressive regime at a time when the regime
appeared weakened and endured mutual civic grievance. Saddam shut down the Shi’ite
movement rapidly, and the Kurdish oppression followed—but shutting this movement
down was not completed without first inflicting great harm on the Kurdish population,
causing an international outcry at the slaughter. The distress of the Iraqi people, who had
gone from a nation at war, to a nation at war with itself, was evident.
Disconnect of the 1990s
The Gulf War brought an end to any lasting thoughts of Arab unity throughout
the region and the 1990s up to the early 2000s brewed disconnect among states in the
region as each state pursued their own agenda. The region lacked a Nasser-esque leader
promoting such a vision and the idea of an Arab identity dissipated as the need to
promote self interests, such as countering faltering economies, thrived.54 As evident in
the Iran Revolution and as would increasingly become apparent, the political power
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vacuum left as Pan-Arabism dissipated would be filled by political and fundamentalist
Islam.55
Failures of the 20th Century
The Middle East throughout the 20th century faced immense sociopolitical change
and political turmoil. From the power void capitalized and exploited on by Western
imperialism at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, to the emergence and expansion of
nationalism and associated modernization programs under repressive and corrupt
autocracies, the environment fostered by the creation of Israel to the resultant return to
Islamic fundamentalism left insurgencies a viable option, as secular state systems
fostered repeated failure. These reasons, amongst others, have contributed to the unrest
in the region into the 21st century as these failures instigated further political unrest,
social disgruntlement, and mounting economic catastrophes.56 With the turn of the
century, 9/11 sparked increasing Western responses to the Middle Eastern conflict—US
led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq proved short-lived success with results fostering an
environment increasingly susceptible to fundamentalist organization influence.57
State failures and insurgencies of the 20th century and into the 21st century have
evolved out of sociopolitical catalysts for institutional change with the major categories
being: internal politics, international factors, civil unrest, solidarity/commonality, and
socioeconomic factors.58 As highlighted throughout this analysis of the 20th century, the
susceptibility of the Middle East to Sunni Islamic fundamentalist groups is part of a series
of reactions in response to a collection of cultural, political, and social breakdowns across
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time and throughout the region.59 The purpose of the scrutiny of the 20th century in this
analysis is to explore the region’s evolution of reactions to the perpetual catalysts for
institutional change. These catalysts for institutional transformation are highlighted
below.

(Pelletier, et al. 2016, pg. 878)

Flawed States in the 21st Century
While the catalysts for change have remained largely the same over time,
perpetuated by continued institutional failure, and having continued into the 21st
century—as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan pre-21st century -- it is the turn to
fundamentalism as the sociopolitical vehicle of reaction which has achieved prominence
59
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in the 21st century. Understanding this point is important when evaluating the success of
IS and similar extremist Sunni organizations and understanding the draw to such
organizations.
The success of extremist organizations is fueled not simply by the ideology of
fundamentalism, but is a deeply rooted sociopolitical reaction to perpetual institutional
problems that have had reverberating ramifications across the political, social, and
economic spheres. As Bernard Haykel persuasively summarizes, “while ideology plays a
role in shaping the actions of these groups, jihadism is also a product of a history of
misrule, brutal authoritarianism, and the recent marginalization of Sunni populations in
the Arab world.”60
Afghanistan War
The US war with Afghanistan began with the goal of eliminating Osama Bin
Laden and al-Qaeda as well as taking down the Afghanistan ruling regime, the Taliban,
for playing hostess to this extremist organization. While these goals were rapidly
obtained, war in Afghanistan would last for over thirteen years—becoming the longest
war the U.S. has ever seen, as the goals for the Afghan occupation altered and expanded.
Despite concerted efforts by the US and the NATO-framework International Security
Assistance Force to establish and stabilize a new government, they were not prominent
and persuasive enough to secure a stable state that dissolved influence on society by the
Taliban, which to this day remains an insurgent force with some level of influence,
wreaking havoc on the Western-established Afghan government. Some account the
shifting mission of the operations in Afghanistan to “counterterrorism to nation building
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to counterinsurgency” as a large part of the issue, as well as the differences in goals
between the United States and Afghanistan.61
Post-Afghanistan War, the state of Afghanistan fares little to no better than
before. Government corruption is immense, with a 2010 UN survey reporting that one out
of every two Afghan adults paid kickback bribes to government officials to obtain basic
public services, paying over $2.5 billion, equating to over 23 percent of the country’s
GDP.62 Afghan security forces also remain corrupt and ineffective at upholding the rule
of law, the government remains autocratic and representatives' loyalties lie with officials
above them rather than the citizens themselves. The rampant instability perpetuates the
failure to secure a stabile national economy that does not rely on international support.54
What social infrastructural successes exist are unlikely to sustain longevity while the
government remains dependent upon financial patronage of international agencies. This
issue is apparent by government expenditures which exceed domestic revenues three fold,
and two-thirds of that budget originates with international aid sources.54
The issues that have perpetuated throughout US occupation of Afghanistan and
into the present day continue to de-legitimize state authority and continue to inspire the
missions of fundamentalist Sunni Islamic organizations such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda
as they continue to provide an already established body of legitimacy—religious
authority that provides unity across the sociopolitical stratosphere (nonetheless, it is duly
noted that there was success in reducing al-Qaeda into a fraction of what it used to be,
due to international military action). Paired with the region’s history of non-state actors
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and organizations rebelling against failing states to achieve more stabilized economic,
political, and social infrastructure, the draw towards fundamentalist Sunni Islamic
organizations is not an unfamiliar catalyst of change within the region. Notably, however,
al-Qaeda it is not the only fundamentalist actor within the region.
Iraq War
The US war with Iraq, initiated by President Bush in March 2003 on the false
premises that Iraq was in possession of chemical weapons and that the ruling regime had
ties to al-Qaeda, would result in the dissolution of the ruling Iraqi Ba’ath party and lead
to the extermination of President Saddam Hussein. Much like that of the Afghanistan
war, initial results appeared successful, but the long term mission and outcomes would
prove controversial at best, and at worst, an abysmal failure. The goal was to create a
democratic state system representative of the diverse makeup of Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia
populations. Similar to other power vacuums created by the elimination of an
authoritative regime, the fall of Saddam did not result in a peaceful acquisition of a
representative democracy, but instead resulted in the warring of sectarian factions—in
this instance the majority fell between Shia and Sunnis. Tensions between factions only
increased with the election of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister in 2005. Maliki’s
policies increased tensions, alienating the Sunni minority—building upon Sunni
disenfranchisement felt by the US dissolution of the Baath party and elimination of all
military and political Baath party members from elite positions during early US
occupation.
The de-Baathification of Iraq’s military and political spheres would prove to be a
large contributor to the formation and success of ISIL (to expand to ISIS and then the
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Islamic State) and enhance leadership with these trained military and politically eloquent
previous Baath party members. The Baath party had come to power after the 1968 coup,
where Saddam played a large role. The party was known for its radical Arab nationalist
stance, particularly against the Palestine dilemma. The party rapidly gained members,
condemning imperialist governments, purporting Islam, and drawing on members from
all classes. The disenfranchisement of the widely recognized Baath party from elite
positions within the state and across the realm of influence after the US invasion of Iraq
insured their resistance against the new authorities. The instability prevalent still today in
Iraq speaks to the failure to establish a stable government and subsequent failure to
provide social and political stability and a viable economic infrastructure. Summarized
effectively, “the Iraq War’s greatest lesson and legacy: there was no political corollary to
America’s overwhelming military power.” (287)
The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011 saw an almost immediate rise of
insurgencies amongst the various factions, particularly within the Sunni community with
regard to the Shia led government and exclusionary policies. The rise of ISIS followed,
expounding upon the anger towards sectarian policies and the continued failed nature of
the state.
Modernization and Political Islamic Fundamentalism
It is increasingly evident that the Sunni Islamic fundamentalism employed by
extremist organizations in the Middle East is correlated with the failed attempts to
construct state structures that support political, social, and economic stability within the
region. Where religion used to provide authority and legitimacy to society, modernity
brought with it the rise and employment of reason to provide legitimacy to the state
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authority.63 Modernization brought the secularization of states and subsequent
suppression of political opposition and religious factions, large expenditures on
infrastructure, and often times heavy reliance on Western powers to finance such
projects. In the long run this led largely to economic disparities, over-expansion, rapid
urban growth in population while lacking the infrastructure and economic stability to
support, and an increasingly wide gap between the rich and the poor—where some
benefitted, most saw the advancement of modernity as an advancement of inequality.64
These are some aspects brought to the region by modernization that would, in the long
run, prove to cause increased instability in many instances and contribute to the turn
towards Sunni Islamic fundamentalism as a solution.
Arab Spring
For the greater purpose of this analysis, a contracted review of the Arab Spring
demonstrates a popular uprising against a series of repressive regimes across the Middle
East and North African regions, largely based on authoritarian regime failure to address
economic uncertainty, mass numbers of educated but unemployed and dissatisfied youth,
and deplorable living conditions. The Arab Spring called for freedom from repressive and
corrupt regimes with replacement by democratic governments. While there occurred a
series of overthrows of authoritative regimes, today most of these nations remain turmoil
ridden and undemocratic.
Arguably, the Arab Spring, by failing to produce the desired responses, has
created additional crevices within society and the state authorities for extremist
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organizations to exploit.65 Syria demonstrates the expansion of turmoil since the Arab
Spring, contracting into a civil war without the success of an overthrow of the Assad
regime. Hundreds of thousands have been killed, millions have been internally and
externally displaced, and even more require humanitarian aid.60 Not unfamiliar to civil
wars, a series of rebel factions have formed or expanded into Syria and wreak havoc on
the state, with IS being the most prominent non-state actor. There is no sign pointing
towards the acquisition of a democratic future for Syria in the immediate future. In Libya,
a similar situation of turmoil without democratic avail persists. The takedown of the
brutal dictator Moammar Gadhafi in October of 2011 resulted in the implosion of the
central state. The power void resulted in civil war that exists still today with warring rebel
militias. IS has seeped into Libya and maintains some level of influence despite US
attempts to eradicate them. These are not rare results of the Arab Spring; as of right now
only Tunisia has achieved the sought after outcome of the revolt against authoritarian
regimes sparking from the Arab Spring.
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Politicization of Religiosity
The religious, political, and societal turmoil of the 20th century accrued over the
century, expressed as political disgruntlement in different forms of responses, initially by
way of nationalism, in response to imperialist incursions and the establishment of
imperially-endorsed political regimes. As nationalist state systems also failed to secure
desired stability, fractures within society spawned fundamentalistic religious rebellions
with thoroughly subversive political agendas. 66 While this analysis focuses largely on
politicized Sunni Islam organizations, politicized religiosity takes many shapes within the
Middle East and outside of the region as well.
Understanding the politicization of religiosity requires the understanding that
religion offers not only a system of morals to live by, but also “claims to offer a superior
understanding of social reality, justice, order, and stability,” as well as provide the
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vehicle by which social and political change may be achieved.67 Consider the Euthyphro
dilemma proposed by Socrates which addresses moral righteousness—is something
right/morally good because it is commanded by God, or because it is intrinsically
right/morally good? Is the legitimacy of authority conceived from the divine or from
reason? “Humans are cause-seeking, purpose-forming, storytelling animals…we find
patterns in nature and look for the hidden springs and principals,” as with making sense
of the world around us and making sense of authority—of which both promotes our best
interest and limits our capacities—is an inherently human notion.68 When considering the
basis for authority and the basis for challenging authority, the debate of divine right and
authority versus inherent right and authority is directly pertinent and plays into the
conflict between secular states and fundamentalist religious rebellions today.
Authority finds its initial basis in the acceptance by those over whom it governs.
If those abiding by the authority feel it does not support their best interests or it continues
to fail to provide what is sought from the implied obedience associated with abiding by
state authority, rebellion is not not an unusual response. Bolstering this idea is Max
Weber’s concept that state authority is “rooted in its capacity to enforce power through
the use of socially approved bloodshed—in police authority, capital punishment, and
armed defense—religion is the only other entity that can give moral sanction for violence,
it is therefore at least potentially revolutionary.”69
Religious rebellions thrive as a proposed alternative to the standing political
authority (at least initially), as they provide an alternative to secular authority that is well-
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understood, legitimized, and respected across the sociopolitical sectors in the Middle
East region.70 Sultan Tepe’s Crisis Model advocates that these groups are “reacting to
modernity by asserting tradition” in the face of “growing disillusionment with secular
nationalism and problems of legitimacy in the existing regimes.”71 As secular,
authoritative regimes, emulate the perception of failure with regard to societal
expectations for economic welfare or political freedom or state stability, fundamental
religious rebellious movements have gained traction, filling the ideological and political
voids.
As a region richly steeped in a history of religious influence in all aspects of life,
mobilizing religion as a facilitator for political change speaks to a broad audience—
spanning social divisions, generating legitimacy, and offering a rich history with the
ability to provide an alternative authority to secular ruled nations that failed to provide for
the desired stability.
Religion carries a significant capacity to influence political
beliefs and participation, given its symbolic system,
organizational structure, and the power to affect the public
imagination with historically entrenched allegories…includes
five important ideational and behavioral constructs directly
affecting politics: order, commitment, ritual, common allegories,
and the sense of history.72
While Sunni extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, IS, and Boko Haram vary in
tactics, goals, etc., there remains a common linkage of their missions—to “create a
popular uprising, destroy Western influence, and reestablish the caliphate system.”73
Seeking a Sunni fundamentalist response became the fitting resolution as regimes proved
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to fail time and again, perpetuating social injustice, lack of stability, injustice and
corruption, and disorder. “Fundamentalism breeds in a vacuum of intellectual political
discourse, when the authoritarianism of the state makes it impossible to discuss and
examine complex social and political problems in a reasoned manner.”74 As repressive,
ineffective, and nondemocratic regimes continue into the 21st century, the politicization
of religion in an extreme fundamentalist form represents a channel providing an attempt
at region-wide recognition of legitimacy and authority.
Summary
This analysis seeks to address the sociopolitical happenings, with particular focus
on the 20th century, that have come to influence the susceptibility of the region to Sunni
Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Historic influencers have greatly amplified the
region’s susceptibility to insurgency by fundamentalist organizations, undermining and
calling to question the legitimacy of state authority. While this inquiry falls far short of
providing an in-depth examination of the history of the Middle East or a sufficient
breakdown of the modern nations’ individualized difficulties, it seeks to provide an
overview of the complexities involved, in hopes of better understanding their selfreplicating sociopolitical pathologies.
A brief glance at the Ottoman Empire demonstrates a decentralized, provincially
based governmental system that reigned for multiple centuries across a vast region deeply
divided by religious and ethnic factions. Yet political unity was sustained and arguably a
religion-based political order was the glue holding it together. The drastic divestment
from this system towards the imperialism that followed would result in the rise of a
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myriad of social, political, economic, religious, and cultural issues across the region.
Self-advancing, short-sighted, and uninformed decisions made by imperialist powers
would set the stage for continued conflicts over the coming century.
Nationalism would formulate across the region as a reactionary measure to
imperialism—as a backlash against imperialist exploitation, failure to address social,
political, and cultural divisions, and growing feelings of resentment. As conflict only
proved to increase, nationalism would increasingly become militaristic and suppressive in
nature. But over time secular nationalist regimes would prove a failure at meeting social,
economic, and political expectations—proving a disgrace and enhancing feelings of
resentment towards the established authority. The modernization that flourished under
nationalist regimes suppressed religious and political differences and proved to advance
inequality and social distance in class groups. The fundamentalistic politicized religious
responses that would come to rise were viewed by a significant portion of the population
as an alternative to the standing states and their failures to address the perpetual political
and ideological voids.
The politicization of religiosity has seen levels of success by way of
fundamentalist insurgency groups as authority asserted with divine backing and the
promise to fill political, social, economic, cultural, and religious divisions is asserted. In a
region where secular authorities have demonstrated an inability to provide stabilized
governments that meet the needs of the people while accounting for the complexities of
the region, fundamentalist backlashes with a basis of authority rooted in the divine in a
region with a rich history of religious authority is not surprising.
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The purpose of this analysis is not to provide utopian solutions steeped in Western
ideals, but is an attempt to shed light on the complexity of the region, about which
considerable amounts of the Western world are woefully uninformed. This exploration
reviews the overarching difficulties that have perpetuated particularly over the last
century with failed states and failed outside influencers. In order for the region to attempt
to secure a more stabile region, the inherent social, cultural, religious, political, and
economic difficulties need to be addressed and stabilized states enhancing these elements
should be cultivated and supported.
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